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This paper seeks to establish the importance of targeted advertising in media mar-
kets. Using zip-code level circulation for US daily newspapers, I show that newspapers
facing more competition have lower circulation prices but higher advertising prices than
similar newspapers facing little or no competition. I explain this by showing that news-
papers in more competitive markets are better able to segment readers according to
their location and demographics. This leads to greater homogeneity in the characteris-
tics of subscribers and raises advertisers’ willingness to pay for such readers. The results
imply a substantial bene￿t to advertisers and media ￿rms from targeted advertising.
JEL Codes: D4, L1, L82
1 Introduction
In this paper I investigate whether media targeting can raise the value of advertising. I
estimate the extent to which the price of print advertising varies as a function of observable
characteristics of the subscriber base, and, in particular, the degree of homogeneity of these
subscribers. I also provide a framework to understand how any advertising medium { print,
radio, television or the internet { is dependent on e￿ciently reaching a core, target audience
that maximizes the return to placing an advertisement in that medium.
The basis of this paper is the hypothesis that media which reach more concentrated or
homogenous groups of consumers should be able, all else equal, to charge higher advertising
prices than media reaching more diverse, heterogenous groups of consumers. Consider
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1two hypothetical cities with the same population and demographic characteristics. In the
￿rst, there are two newspapers, each of which has roughly uniform sales across the various
demographic groups in the city. In the second, there are also two newspapers, with similar
levels of circulation as in the ￿rst city, but they reach very segmented groups of subscribers;
for example, one has sales concentrated among a￿uent readers, while the other is read
primarily by low-income readers. Under fairly reasonable assumptions on consumer and
advertiser behavior, it is possible to show that average advertising prices will be higher in
the second case. More generally, media that successfully segment their subscribers according
to income, age, race, geographic location, or political leaning, are likely to charge higher
advertising prices, per subscriber. In other words, media that are successful in targeting
homogenous groups of consumers should be able to charge higher advertising prices. In this
paper, I examine whether this phenomenon holds true in newspaper markets and attempt
to quantify the extent to which it can be seen.
In general, advertisers should be willing to pay high premiums to have information
about consumer characteristics, either because they can tailor their advertising content
more speci￿cally to smaller, sharply di￿erentiated groups of consumers, or because they
can choose exactly which groups to advertise to and which ones to ignore, thereby reaching
a more preferred audience. The more information they have about the characteristics of
the subscribers of a medium, the more valuable it is to be able to market their products
to them, holding all else constant. Hence, the opportunity to advertise in a medium that
reaches a large number of heterogenous consumers is less attractive than the opportunity
to place separate ads in smaller, better de￿ned media.
Of course, I am not suggesting that all advertisers will value more homogenous groups
of subscribers. Indeed, advertisers care most about reaching subscribers who will give them
the greatest return on their advertising investment and, thus, may even be willing to see
greater heterogeneity among subscribers if that leads to an increase in the advertiser’s pre-
ferred demographic. For example, a retailer selling products aimed at women would rather
advertise in a market that is 50% male than 100% male. However, if the segmentation of a
large market into smaller groups of homogenous consumers aids advertisers in concentrating
their marketing dollars, then it will increase the aggregate demand for advertising, keeping
all else constant, and this will be re￿ected in higher advertising prices in such markets. My
hypothesis is not that every advertiser’s willingness-to-pay for advertising will increase in
the level of homogeneity of the subscribers; it is simply that the market price will increase
in this level of homogeneity.
The rewards to reaching a select group of homogenous consumers are quite apparent.
Targeted advertising is becoming ubiquitous, and not just in media markets. Increasingly,
political parties and organizations are using sophisticated techniques to predict voting be-
2havior, and hence target potential donors and supporters, based on purchasing behavior,
church attendance, television viewership, or other characteristics of the population. Tar-
geting is practiced by banks and credit card companies, who try to reach certain groups
of customers based on their spending pro￿les, credit scores or other risk factors. And tar-
geting is widely observed in the media, whereby advertisers place their advertisements in
newspapers and magazines or on particular television and radio shows, to maximize the
probability that the audience will be swayed by the advertisement to purchase the product.
As more information about consumers becomes available, aided by additional segmentation
provided by Internet usage behavior, the targeting of advertising in the media is sure to
grow in importance.
Newspaper markets provide a natural way to examine the targeting of advertising be-
cause they have the advantage of providing complete, accurate data on the reading prefer-
ences of the population, as well as multiple dimensions along which readers are segmented
into groups, such as location and demographics. Compared to broadcast media such as
network television and radio, print media have a distinguishing characteristic in that they
charge a positive price for both sets of goods that they produce.1 This is an advantage
for researchers since the sales data provide exact information on the quantity and location
of newspaper consumption and therefore on the characteristics of the subscriber base. For
radio, quantity data are usually based on estimates from diary records; and for television,
Nielsen data often have credibility problems due to doubts about the representativeness
of the sample. Besides, audience ￿gures in these markets are estimates based on samples
that make prior assumptions about viewing behavior by various demographic groups, while
newspaper circulation data are audited measures of actual sales. For this reason, newspaper
circulation data are probably superior for the analysis that follows of how segmentation and
geographic dispersion a￿ect advertising prices.
The results support the hypothesis that targeting groups of similar consumers is more
valuable. While I do not have data on the characteristics of individual readers, or even
average characteristics for individual newspapers, I am able to infer the variation in these
characteristics using variation in the sales of newspapers across markets. The results show
that advertising prices have a very clear and signi￿cant relationship with characteristics
of the subscriber base. Speci￿cally, various speci￿cations of my baseline model show that
newspapers with more homogenous readers charge signi￿cantly higher advertising prices
per reader. This homogeneity is de￿ned according to a number of di￿erent characteristics-
the degree of geographic dispersion of the subscriber base; and variation in demographics
such as income, education and race. Therefore it appears that targeting a niche audience
1Television and radio stations distribute their programming content free of charge. Cable and satellite
TV viewers, however, do pay a price for their service. Though even in this case consumers usually pay for
a package of television channels, rarely paying for the marginal channel or tv show.
3of subscribers can be pro￿table for media ￿rms.
This paper adds to the empirical literature on media markets in a number of ways.
First, its focus on advertising prices rather than subscriber bene￿ts ￿lls an obvious gap;
recent empirical research has tended to examine media markets from the point of view of
readers or listeners rather than from the point of view of advertisers.2 Second, this paper
has a potential policy implication in that it makes the case that media ￿rms should be
treated as monopolists in advertising markets to the extent that their products are not just
di￿erentiated but mutually exclusive in terms of subscribers. This, along with the focus
on the under-examined advertising side of the market, implies that answers to questions
regarding total welfare and the optimal number of ￿rms require much greater care than
may be immediately apparent.
Further, this paper makes an important contribution to existing studies of newspaper
markets. I use detailed zip-code level data on circulation which provide a much clearer
picture of competition than the aggregate data used in some previous work. The zip-code
data dispel the notion, which is common in the literature, that most newspaper publishers
are actually monopolists; while this may be true for the number of publishers in a city,
more than half of all zip-codes in my dataset have at least two daily newspapers operating,
with some having as many as 15. And it is precisely due to having such detailed data that
I can make inferences about the underlying characteristics of subscribers, which would be
impossible with aggregate data.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on media markets
and, in particular, newspaper markets. Section 3 presents a Hotelling-type model which
demonstrates how it is theoretically possible for advertising prices per reader to go up when
more media ￿rms enter the market. It then brie￿y describes the estimating equation that
will be taken to the data. Section 4 describes the data available for estimation. Results are
presented in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Research
There has been substantial work on media markets, and in particular the newspaper in-
dustry.3 For a comprehensive survey of the literature on advertising, see Bagwell (2007).
There is a growing literature on media markets in the context of two-sided industries; re-
cent examples include Kaiser and Wright (2004) and Chandra (2006b). This literature is
surveyed in Anderson and Gabszewicz (2005).
2See, for example, George and Waldfogel (2003), Berry and Waldfogel (2001) and Berry and Waldfogel
(1999).
3Some of the older papers include Rosse (1970), Dertouzos and Trautman (1990) and Thompson (1989).
An example of more recent work is Gentzkow (2007). Chandra (2006b) surveys this literature.
4There has also been recent, mainly theoretical, work examining targeted advertising or
studying its e￿ects on prices and competition. Most of this research has assumed that ￿rms
can directly target di￿erent groups of consumers, i.e. without considering the intermediary
role of media. Hernandez-Garcia (1997) shows that in a monopolistic framework, targeting
of consumers with a low valuation of the good may reduce consumer surplus and even social
welfare. A similar conclusion is reached by Esteban et al. (2001). Dukes (2004) shows that
greater media di￿erentiation can possibly lead to socially excessive levels of advertising.
On the other hand, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) show that an improved ability to target
advertising increases the competitiveness of the market and causes prices of advertised goods
to fall. Galeotti and Moraga-Gonz￿ alez (2004) ￿nd that if ￿rms are allowed to target distinct
groups of consumers, their pro￿ts rise. Iyer et al. (2005) also show that targeted advertising
leads to less wasteful advertising, and higher pro￿ts for ￿rms.
Among the few papers that incorporate the role of the media, Gal-Or and Dukes (2003)
show that advertising prices can actually increase when media are less di￿erentiated. This
follows as a result of lower levels of information available to consumers and therefore higher
margins for advertising ￿rms.4
Turning to empirical work, there have been a number of studies of the e￿ect of readers’
characteristics on advertising prices, although with very little mention of the role of reader
homogeneity in these markets. Thompson (1989) examines British newspapers and Dep-
ken (2004) and Koschat and Putsis (2000) examine reader characteristics in US magazine
markets. Using television data, Kieschnick et al. (2001) provide an empirical model that
separates the willingness-to-pay by advertisers of two di￿erent consumer types. Also see
George and Waldfogel (2003) who use a dataset very similar to mine, although they do not
examine advertising prices.
Goettler (1999) performs a very similar exercise to mine using data on television shows.
While he also examines the optimal scheduling of these shows, he uses data on the expected
demographic characteristics of viewers of individual shows to infer the value of particular
demographic groups, as well as the value attached to viewer homogeneity. His results clearly
show that greater homogeneity in age and gender are associated with signi￿cantly higher
advertising prices per viewer.
The product level data on subscribers used by Goettler are extremely desirable for
studying the e￿ects of subscriber characteristics in advertising markets. Note, however,
that similar data on average characteristics of newspaper readers are simply not available,
at least not separately for all newspapers in the industry, and therefore must be inferred
from the variation in aggregate data, which is what I do in the analysis below. Moreover, the
4See also Wildman (2003) which theoretically examines the e￿ect of di￿erent types of television viewers
on ad prices.
5newspaper data also allow me to identify the e￿ect of geographic dispersion on advertising
prices, which is not something that can be easily done in television markets; Goettler, for
example, does not have data on the physical location of television audiences.5 He also does
not have data on race, income or education, which I ￿nd to be useful explanatory variables
in the newspaper market.
Koschat and Putsis (2002) attempt to estimate the e￿ect of \unbundling" in magazine
advertising. That is, they use the estimated coe￿cients on various demographic characteris-
tics to predict advertising prices in the counterfactual event of advertisers being permitted
to directly reach smaller groups having these characteristics. They infer an advertising
premium from publishing homogenous editions.6
Two recent papers study the determinants of advertising pricing in television mar-
kets. Wilbur (2007) empirically examines the determinants of television advertising pricing,
though without having demographic data for television viewers. Fu et al. (2007) also ex-
amine the role of consumer homogeneity in determining advertising prices. However, their
measure relies on consumer purchasing behavior, as opposed to my measure which relies
on demographics. They show that television advertising prices increase with the degree to
which the program’s viewers make similar choices among advertised products, among other
factors.
Finally, there has been recent work examining online advertising. Goldfarb and Tucker
(2007) show that the wide variation in the pricing of online search advertisements results
from price discrimination by the search-engine vendor and re￿ects the ability of the vendor
to extract surplus from advertisers who face varying market conditions. These results are
consistent with the e￿ects of targeted advertising. An interesting parallel to my application
has been found in the online market for search-engine advertising. Ghose and Yang (2007)
￿nd that ￿rms bid higher prices (on a pay-per-click basis) for longer search terms. This
corresponds to ￿rms placing a higher value, per expected consumer, on more narrow searches
which is consistent with a story of targeted advertising.7
5It may not be very meaningful to examine the e￿ect of geographic dispersion in the market for adver-
tising in the national networks since these channels presumably have a far lower fraction of location-speci￿c
advertising than do local newspapers. An interesting avenue for research would be to study how much
location-speci￿c advertising is shown by local stations or a￿liates especially as audiences become more
geographically concentrated.
6This study makes some rather strong assumptions, namely that characteristics of the magazines includ-
ing prices, and proportional sales would be unchanged if the magazines were to directly sell to individual
demographic groups. By contrast, my method directly measures the homogeneity level at existing newspa-
pers and estimates its e￿ect on advertising prices.
7Somewhat surprisingly, in my view, the authors go on to conclude that this behavior is sub-optimal,
and that advertisers should in fact bid lower amounts for longer keyword searches.
63 A Model of Advertising Pricing in Di￿erentiated Media
In this section I describe a simple model that provides intuition on the e￿ect of di￿erentiated
media in advertising markets. I also specify the estimating equation that will be used to
test for the e￿ects of targeted advertising in newspaper markets.
3.1 A Hotelling Model of Di￿erentiated Media
The following model describes a market with di￿erentiated consumers, and the value to
advertisers from reaching consumers of a certain type. The di￿erentiation can be geographic,
or along other dimensions such as demographic characteristics.
Consider a model in which consumers of measure 1 are uniformly distributed on the
line segment [0,1]. There is also a continuum of ￿rms of measure 1 distributed uniformly
along the same line segment. These ￿rms are potential advertisers in the existing news
or entertainment media. If a consumer at location ￿ sees an advertisement by a ￿rm at
location x then the probability that she will buy a unit of the ￿rm’s good is given by
p(￿;x) = 1￿(￿ ￿x)2: Therefore the probability that the consumer buys from a ￿rm at her
very own location, conditional on seeing the ￿rm’s advertisement is 1.8
The net return to any ￿rm from a transaction with a consumer is given by v. Media
￿rms set the price of advertising and can display any number of advertisements, though at
a marginal cost C > 0:
I consider two cases: in Case 1, there is a single media ￿rm in the market, reaching
the entire mass of consumers. In Case 2, there are two media in the market, with Medium
1 reaching consumers located in the interval [0;1=2] and Medium 2 reaching consumers
located in the interval [1=2;1]. Note that in this model I abstract away from ￿xed costs
of operating, and thus the entry behavior of media ￿rms, as well as pricing behavior and
competition on the subscriber side of the market. The objective here is simply to focus
on the e￿ect on advertising prices as the market structure changes from a monopoly to a
duopoly.
It is straightforward to show that, except when marginal costs are very low, advertising
prices per reader are higher in the duopoly than in the monopoly. Essentially, despite
having competition between two ￿rms, Case 2 o￿ers a higher valuation to advertisers and the
increase in value outweighs the competitive e￿ect to the extent that prices per consumer are
higher in this case. This is because the two media segment the market and allow advertisers
to appeal to more valuable consumers. It is only in the case that costs are very low that
the monopoly ￿rm can continue to extract the entire willingness-to-pay from advertisers,
8This functional form was chosen for its tractability. Results are similar using the function p(￿;x) =
1 ￿ j￿ ￿ xj.
7while the duopolists compete prices down to below the monopoly level.
This result is not driven by the assumption on the distribution of consumers. Assuming
instead that consumers follow a Beta distribution on [0;1] leads to a greater mass of con-
sumers at the center of the line, and therefore ensures that an advertiser closer to x = 1=2
has a much greater willingness-to-pay for advertising than in the case with the uniform
distribution. Even though this implies that the duopolists compete more ￿ercely for these
advertisers, the result is essentially unchanged; except for very low levels of cost, prices per
consumer are higher in duopoly than in monopoly.
It is important to note that we observe higher advertising prices per capita with two
￿rms, even in the presence of competition. If I remove the restriction that ￿rms can place
a maximum of one advertisement, and instead allow them to purchase ads at any medium
where the expected return outweighs the cost, the result is even stronger. This is because
each media ￿rm behaves as a monopolist with respect to its own circulation base. Prices
are not competed down to attract the marginal advertiser, and therefore having multiple
media leads to higher advertising prices due to the increase in value from being able to
target consumers. The model above emphasizes that, even when media ￿rms compete for
advertisers, we can still observe higher advertising prices per consumer. This simple model
shows that a greater number of media can increase targeting of consumers thereby making
it more valuable, per consumer, to advertise in the di￿erentiated media. I now examine
whether we observe this phenomenon empirically.
3.2 The Model: Determining the Price of Advertising
It may at ￿rst seem natural to assume that advertisers view di￿erent newspapers as substi-
tutes. However, the degree of substitutability depends on newspaper readership; in particu-
lar, the extent of overlap among rival newspapers and, therefore, the extent to which there
is a business-stealing e￿ect in print advertising markets. In the extreme case, with zero
overlap of readers across newspapers, every newspaper publisher is a monopolist with re-
spect to its circulation base.9 At the other extreme, with complete overlap, the newspapers
are perfect substitutes.
In the market for local newspapers in the US, a reasonable assumption is that most
consumers purchase at most one local paper. This is an assumption used to motivate the
discrete choice model of Chandra (2006a). As discussed in that paper, the data support the
notion that consumers rarely buy multiple papers at the local level. While consumers often
9Even in the case with zero readership overlap, newspapers are not exactly monopolists in the larger
advertising market since they still face competition from other media such as television, radio and direct
mail. However, they can be considered to be monopolists within the newspaper market; that is, they can
ignore advertising prices set by other newspaper publishers.
8buy a national paper in conjunction with a local paper, the product o￿erings are usually
quite di￿erent, and potential advertisers are drawn from di￿erent pools as well.
Note that a similar assumption is made by Rysman (2002) in the market for Yellow Page
advertising. He assumes that demand by advertisers is separable at various Yellow Page
directories; i.e., advertisers make decisions on whether to advertise at any given directory
independent of characteristics and prices at other directories. This implies that publishers
ignore the prices set by rival publishers. Rysman also presents empirical evidence to support
this assumption.
In practice, ￿rms may face credit constraints that prevent them from borrowing to
advertise in anticipation of future pro￿ts, or they may be forced to operate within an
advertising budget for other reasons. If that is the case, then newspapers can no longer be
viewed as monopolists in the advertising market, even if there is zero overlap of readers,
and price competition will ensue. In the empirical section, I include controls for the number
of ￿rms in order to check for this possibility.
For a given newspaper, there is a certain value that an advertiser derives from placing
an ad in it: this value is a function of the number of readers; their characteristics such as
location and demographics; the probability that they see the advertisement and decide to
purchase the advertised product; and the expected pro￿t that the ￿rm makes from their
purchase. If this value exceeds the advertising price, the advertisement should be placed, re-
gardless of prices in other newspapers. There is nothing stopping potential advertisers from
advertising in multiple papers, as long as the return they derive from their advertisement
exceeds the price that they pay at each paper.
Assuming, therefore, that the advertising decision is separate across di￿erent newspa-
pers, I represent the expected pro￿t to ￿rm i from advertising at newspaper k as:
￿ik = f(Nk;qk;Xk;Dik) ￿ pk
Here, Nk is a newspaper speci￿c term which denotes the value of an advertisement in
newspaper k that is independent of the characteristics of its circulation; for example, the
probability that a given advertisement is seen by the newspaper’s readers. In practice Nk
can be captured by the number of pages in newspaper k. The number of subscribers is
given by qk and their characteristics are contained in Xk. Dik is a newspaper-advertiser
speci￿c term which captures the idiosyncratic value that advertiser i places on reaching
the subscribers of newspaper k; for example, the physical distance between the advertising
￿rm and the newspaper’s readers. Finally, pk is the price of advertising at newspaper k.
Note that the advertiser’s pro￿t is not dependent on characteristics of the newspaper such as
quality, editorial content or political leaning. This is because the pro￿t is directly a function
of the number of newspapers sold. Conditional on this number, the only newspaper-speci￿c
9characteristics that advertisers care about are the probability that their advertisement is
actually seen and the characteristics of the readers.
The pro￿t function above, when combined with assumptions about the competitive na-
ture of the advertising market, leads to a straight-forward derivation of a reduced form
relationship expressing advertising prices as a function of the number of newspaper sub-
scribers and their characteristics. Note that such a relationship can be derived, using
standard techniques, no matter whether we assume that the market is competitive, or that
individual newspapers set prices ignoring the actions of other publishers. This equilibrium
relationship treats consumers’ characteristics as demand shifters in the advertising market.
It can be written as
pk = g(Nk;qk;Xk;Dik)
I assume that, conditional on the expected characteristics of the readers of the news-
paper, the return to an advertiser is linear in the number of readers. That is, the value of
reaching two readers with the same expected characteristics is exactly twice the value of
reaching one reader with those characteristics. This assumption abstracts away from the
cost structure of advertisers.10 Nevertheless, it is a realistic representation of newspaper
advertisement pricing; prices are commonly quoted as the rate per thousand readers, i.e. it
is assumed that the total price, and therefore the total value, is proportional to the number
of readers.11
This assumption can be written as,
pk = h(Nk;Xk;Dik) ￿ qk;
or,
Rk = h(Nk;Xk;Dik) (1)
where Rk is the advertising price per reader. The equilibrium relationship, therefore, can
be estimated by regressing advertising prices, normalized by circulation, on characteristics
of subscribers as well as certain newspaper-speci￿c characteristics.
4 Data
The data for this paper are drawn from a number of di￿erent sources. I use zip-code
circulation data from the Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC), an independent, not-for-
10This is because with decreasing returns to scale every additional customer is less valuable than the last
one. With constant marginal cost this is not an issue.
11Previous authors have shown that advertising pro￿ts or prices are directly proportional to the size of
the audience. See, for example, Gabszewicz et al. (2004).
10pro￿t organization that is widely recognized as the leading auditor of periodical information
in the US and many other countries. Potential advertisers in the print media use the
circulation data provided by ABC as the basis for determining where to allocate their
advertising dollars. The ABC data provide detailed information on the circulation of 839
US daily newspapers for the years 1995, 1996, 1998 and 1999. For each newspaper, I know
all the zip codes in which it is present, and the number of copies sold (weekday and Sunday
separately). My dataset does not consist of the entire set of US newspapers; I have left
out some of the largest, national newspapers such as the New York Times and USA Today
because the goal of the paper is to examine how local retailers place advertisements in
newspapers that circulate in surrounding areas. I also do not include some newspapers on
which ABC does not collect data, most of which tend to be very low circulation, small-town
newspapers. Other than the national papers, the newspapers in my dataset are the major
selling dailies, and the only ones on which ABC collects information.
Editor & Publisher magazine is my source of information on advertising rates, aggregate
circulation, and other newspaper characteristics (such as the number of pages per copy) for
the same years. Editor & Publisher is the weekly magazine of the newspaper industry and
it publishes an annual ‘International Yearbook’ with data on virtually every newspaper in
the US. I have matched this information to the newspapers in the ABC database. Finally,
I extracted data from the US Census of 2000 that matches to each zip-code detailed demo-
graphic data: race composition, median income, education distribution and population.12
Summary Statistics of the data are in Table 1. For the circulation ￿gures, each observa-
tion is a newspaper-zip-year combination. The ￿rm level statistics contain data from Editor
& Publisher along with measures of segmentation and geographic dispersion, derived from
demographic data, that I describe in the next section.
The considerable heterogeneity among newspaper publishers leads to some issues re-
garding the data. Foremost is the problem of establishing a criterion to measure the actual
quantity of papers sold; newspapers can either be morning or evening editions (some are
printed at both times, or even throughout the day). Not all newspapers publish on Sat-
urdays or Sundays, and some of the smaller newspapers do not have editions on one or
more weekdays either. I tried using total weekly circulation as the measure of a ￿rm’s
output and market share. However in a number of cities, newspapers that compete during
the week publish joint Sunday editions, which complicates using weekly circulation as a
measure of output. On top of this, there are a few markets where two newspapers have
Joint Operating Agreements or where multiple newspapers are owned by the same parent
company, or where advertising is sold jointly for multiple ￿rms and individual rates are
12The Census does not actually provide data on zipcodes; instead it uses its own geographical de￿nition
called the Zip Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA). The correlation of zip codes to ZCTAs is almost 100%, however
a small fraction of actual zip codes are missing.
11Mean StDev Min Max
Newspaper-zip-years (189271 obs)
Daily Circ. 951 1803 1 39909
Sunday Circ. 1087 2089 0 22981
Zip-codes (27151 obs)
Adult Population (1000) 7.52 10.03 0.01 91.9
Fraction Non-Hispanic White 0.82 0.23 0 1
Median Income (1000) 40.9 16.0 2.5 200.0
Fraction 65+ years 0.19 0.08 0 1
Fraction College Degree 0.19 0.14 0 1
Fraction Male 0.49 0.04 0 1
Newspaper-Years (3356 obs)
Year 1997 1.6 1995 1999
Aggregate Daily Circ. (1000) 53.6 97.0 2.1 1078.2
Median Dist. from Pub. Zip (km) 11.3 9.3 0 100.8
Mean Dist. from Pub. Zip (km) 17.1 12.5 0.8 132.2
Other Firms (MSA only) 2.3 2.9 0 12
Ad. Rate (daily) 43.2 65.8 5 647.8
Pages 35.1 20.6 8.5 249
Fraction Non-Hispanic White 0.80 0.17 0.05 0.98
Median Income (1000) 40.9 9.7 22.5 95.5
Fraction 65+ years 0.18 0.04 0.06 0.41
Fraction College Degree 0.21 0.08 0.07 0.66
Fraction Male 0.48 0.01 0.43 0.59
Ad. rate per 10000 readers 10.44 4.27 2.14 39.23
Retail Establishments 109.4 37.1 9.7 362.2
Table 1: Summary Statistics
12not available. To deal with these issues I only use daily circulation and daily advertising
rates as measures of quantity and price, ignoring weekend circulation and prices.13 I have
included a dummy for whether the newspaper publishes in the evening in the regressions.
I re-estimated all the regressions dropping markets where newspapers have joint operating
agreements or common ownership and found results that were virtually unchanged, whether
I used daily or weekly circulation.
I use these data to derive some simple results to motivate the empirical section and
to show that greater competition does not necessarily imply lower prices in advertising
markets. Table 2 shows the relation between the level of competition faced by various
newspapers in my dataset, and prices. To de￿ne competition, I create a measure that takes
into account the number of competing newspapers in a given newspaper’s general circulation
area. This measure, de￿ned as a newspaper’s Weighted Her￿ndahl index (WH), also takes
into account the intensity of competition that newspapers face. In each zip-code, I compute
the Her￿ndahl index, based on the daily market shares of circulation (s) of newspapers
in the zip-code. Then, for each newspaper, I take the average her￿ndahl index in all the















where r denotes zip-codes and q denotes the generic newspaper in a zip-code.
The ￿rst column of Table 2 ranks the deciles of this competitive index, where newspapers
with the lowest values of WH, that is the newspapers facing the most intense competition,
are in the ￿rst decile and so on. The second column contains the mean circulation price for
each decile of newspapers. There is an obvious positive (and almost monotonic) relation-
ship between circulation prices and the competitive index; newspapers facing less intense
competition tend to have higher circulation prices. Note that the direction of causality
should not be inferred, however the ￿gures support the notion that greater competition is
associated with lower prices.
The third column contains the mean daily advertising price per 10,000 readers for each
decile of newspapers. Clearly, there is a negative relationship between the competitive in-
dex and advertising prices normalized by circulation. The relationship is not monotonic
and, as above, we cannot infer the direction of causality. Nevertheless, it is quite apparent
13This is unfortunate since Sunday advertising rates usually di￿er from weekday rates due to di￿erent
circulation, and so if it had not been for the Sunday joint editions, I could have also used the additional
variation in Sunday prices and quantities to estimate the model.
13Deciles of Mean single-copy Mean advertising rate











Table 2: Newspaper prices by deciles of competitive index
that newspapers with more competitors, and therefore with lower market shares of circu-
lation, have higher advertising prices. Advertising prices decline as newspapers face less
competition. This seems to support the segmentation hypothesis: that markets with more
newspapers tend to segment the readership into distinct groups and this leads to greater
value from advertising to these groups.
It is revealing that the relationship in Column 3 is virtually the opposite of the one
in Column 2. The ￿gures for circulation prices suggest that there are indeed competitive
e￿ects of rival newspapers. Presumably, this competitive e￿ect is present in advertising
markets too. However the results of the third column seem to suggest that the rise in
advertising prices due to the segmentation e￿ect outweighs any possible decline in prices due
to competition. It appears, therefore, that newspapers are e￿cient at targeting newspaper
readers by positioning their products in such a way as to appeal to distinct audiences.
Note that the advertising prices used here are the o￿cial price per column inch of
advertising space. It is not the actual transaction price, which is usually lower, for two
reasons: (a) Due to discounts for large or frequent buyers and (b) Due to quantity discounts
for the size of the advertisement; for example, a full-page ad usually costs less than two half
page ads and so on.
Given that I am estimating the e￿ect of homogeneity on advertising prices, rather
than trying to compute some measure of welfare or surplus, it is not necessary to have
transaction prices as long as the list prices are proportional to transaction prices, and
are not systematically di￿erent from transaction prices for particular kinds of newspapers.
Unfortunately it was not possible for me obtain actual transaction prices to verify this
point. I was, however, able to obtain the entire menu of prices (known as the rate-card)
14at 5 large newspapers. These contain prices for various sizes of advertisements, as well as
rates by day of week, and for classi￿ed advertising. I was able to con￿rm that the rate-card
prices were indeed proportional to the price per column inch for this set of papers. I make
the assumption that the discount o￿ the quoted list prices is not systematically di￿erent
for particular kinds of newspapers. In particular, I assume that newspapers reaching more
homogenous readers do not have systematically larger or smaller discounts from the list
price than other papers.
It is important to note that the data used to derive all of the results in this paper{
both the circulation ￿gures and the demographic variables{ are means or totals at the zip-
code level. Therefore, any inference regarding the e￿ect of demographics on advertising
prices relies on variation in these mean values, as well as the correlation of these means
across zip-codes. These measures mask the variation within zip-codes which, presumably,
is substantial. If data were available on the newspaper purchasing choices and demographic
characteristics of individual readers, I would expect much stronger and more signi￿cant
relationships between demographics and advertising prices. Failing that, data on mean
characteristics of readers at individual newspapers would also be extremely valuable. How-
ever, such data are unavailable to the researcher. While advertisers do have access to better
data, they are usually responses by readers to surveys, and that too for the small subset of
newspapers at which a given advertiser considers placing ads. Compiling a comprehensive
database of individual level data for all newspapers, or even for a representative sample of
newspapers is not feasible.14
Therefore, any relation that I estimate between reader homogeneity and advertising
prices is necessarily a lower bound, as the results rely entirely on across-zipcode variation,
completely ignoring within-zipcode variation.
5 Results
In this section I discuss the empirical formulation that will be used in the estimation of
Equation 1 and present the regression results.
5.1 Empirical Speci￿cation
As claimed before, a newspaper’s ability to segment its readers, or to be able to draw read-
ers with similar characteristics, should result in its being able to charge a higher advertising
price. A paper with a varied, heterogenous readership base dilutes the value to advertising
14In electronic media { such as cable or satellite television and on the internet { the potential for knowing
individual level data on subscribers, or even mean characteristics at individual media ￿rms, is much greater.
See Goettler (1999) for one such study.
15for potential advertisers who would like to be able to target groups that are most likely to
purchase their product. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a measure of reader homo-
geneity, or, alternatively, of the extent to which newspapers segment readers into particular
groups.
Segmentation can occur along many dimensions. An obvious way that newspapers seg-
ment markets is geographically; by appealing to distinct geographic regions of a city or
metropolitan area, these papers then become attractive advertising media for retailers who
want to reach consumers that are located close to them. However, segmentation can also
take place along demographic characteristics such as race, income and education. If adver-
tised products appeal to distinct groups according to one or more of these characteristics,
then advertisers should be willing to pay more for advertising in newspapers that reach
such audiences. In related work, George and Waldfogel (2003) have shown that newspaper
reading preferences increase in the number of people in the same group that read that pa-
per, especially when groups are de￿ned according to race. This suggests that demographic
characteristics are useful predictors of reading preferences and potentially also a means of
targeted advertising.
Ideally, with individual level data on the demographics and location of subscribers, it
would be straightforward to compute the degree of homogeneity of any given newspaper’s
readers. However, such individual level data do not exist. Therefore, to look at the conse-
quences of such segmentation on advertising prices, I exploit the variation in the aggregate
demographic characteristics of the markets served by various newspaper ￿rms.
To ￿nd an appropriate measure of reader homogeneity, it is useful to think about what
causes a newspaper to have a certain audience. The segmentation of readers according
to location or demographics may be a result of product positioning by newspapers or self-
selection by subscribers.15 In any case, if a paper’s audience is well segmented along a certain
dimension, say race, then it should be fairly easy to use variation in race to predict variation
in the newspaper’s circulation. If variation in the fraction of the population that is white is
a good predictor of percapita circulation, it is an indicator of greater homogeneity in reader
characteristics. Therefore the extent to which per capita circulation is predicted by race or
other demographics indicates the extent to which the reading population is segmented along
the corresponding dimension. This suggests that a simple correlation measure should serve
the purpose of measuring segmentation. For the k markets in which newspaper i circulates,
I de￿ne
si = jcorr(x;m)j





is the per capita circulation in zip-code k, and xk is a given demographic variable. As
should be apparent, the correct measure is to use the absolute value of the correlation;
either a highly positive or highly negative correlation implies that circulation is strongly
related to the corresponding demographic measure. Clearly, the correlation measure can
take any value between 0 and 1; the higher the value of the correlation, the better the
predictive power of demographics and the more homogenous the reading population, while
values closer to zero imply that demographics do not predict circulation too well.
The correlation measure of segmentation has the desirable characteristic of directly
relating variation in newspaper sales to variation in demographics. Absent more disaggre-
gated data on demographics, other measures of segmentation are generally not appropriate.
For example, a natural way to measure dispersion is a standard deviation based statistic.
That is, for a given demographic, calculate the standard deviation of the values across the
zip-codes in which a newspaper circulates.16 However, while this works as a measure of
dispersion, it is undesirable as a measure of homogeneity in my particular application. As
an example, consider two cases. In Case 1, we have 2 zip codes where the fraction white
is 0.5 in each zip code. In Case 2 we also have 2 zips where the fraction white is 0.9 and
1. Clearly, the second case represents a more homogenous population, but it will have a
higher standard deviation than the ￿rst case. Note that this problem will also apply to
other measures of calculating dispersion such as the relative mean di￿erence and the Gini
coe￿cient, both of which rely on the di￿erence between various observations, and both of
which would result in a zero value in Case 1 and a positive value in Case 2.
In the regressions that follow, I will use the correlation variable as the measure of reader
homogeneity. Therefore it is important to understand the predictive power of this variable,
as well as the way it enters the regression speci￿cation. One possible objection to using
the correlation measure of segmentation as an explanatory variable would be that it is
not ‘exogenous’ from an econometric standpoint. That is, since newspapers can choose
which zip-codes to enter, they can e￿ectively choose their most desired target audience,
and therefore the measure of reader homogeneity based on demographics may be higher or
lower for certain kinds of newspapers.
However, recall that I am not modeling the entry behavior of ￿rms. I acknowledge
that newspapers do have the power to appeal to, and be read by, their preferred readers.
Nevertheless, the point of this paper is to examine how their success in reaching their desired
audience translates into higher advertising prices via the willingness-to-pay by retailers. In
16This should be weighted by the paper’s circulation in each zipcode.
17the extreme case, it may be possible that newspapers are completely e￿cient at selecting
their most preferred readers. In that event, we may expect demographics to be perfectly
correlated with circulation, and we may be concerned that there may be insu￿cient variation
in the segmentation measure to identify its e￿ect on advertising prices. However, as I show
in Table 3, this is not the case.
The table shows the extent of variation in the correlation measure de￿ned above. The
￿gures are the absolute value of the correlations between per capita readership and the
corresponding demographic. These demographic measures are de￿ned as follows: Race-
the fraction of the zip-code’s population that is Non-Hispanic White; Income- Zip-code
Median Income; Education- the fraction of adults with a college degree; Age- the fraction
of adults who are age 65 or older; Gender- the fraction of adults who are male; Distance-
the zip-code’s distance from the newspaper’s publishing o￿ce. Finally, the last line of
Table 3 combines all of these demographic variables. This is done by regressing, for each
newspaper, its readership per capita on the demographic variables described above, across
all the zip-codes in which it circulates, and then taking the square root of the R-square of
each regression.17 This requires dropping some newspapers which circulate in very few zip-
codes. Since a handful of newspapers circulate in a very small number of zip-codes, some
in as few as 3, these papers would not have enough degrees of freedom to meaningfully
estimate the regression described above using 6 demographic variables. I have dropped the
newspapers circulating in fewer than 9 zip-codes in order to calculate values in the last line
of Table 3.18
All the correlation measures show considerable variation. In particular, the measures
take values very close to zero, implying that there are newspapers for which demographics
have no power to predict circulation, as well as values very close to 1, implying that there
are newspapers for which demographics are excellent predictors of circulation, as well as the
entire range of values in between. Clearly, the distance measure is the single best predictor
of circulation; even at the 5th percentile, there is a 20% correlation between distance from
the newspaper’s publishing o￿ce and per capita readership. Of the demographic variables,
education is the best predictor of circulation, while gender is the worst.19
Unsurprisingly, when combining all the demographic variables, the correlation measures
are much higher. Using this measure, almost half the newspapers in the sample have a
correlation of at least 75%. In principle, it is possible to use many more demographic
variables to try to predict circulation more precisely, however in practice increasing the
17Recall that the square root of the R-square of any regression is exactly the same as the correlation
between the dependent variable and the predicted dependent variable using the estimated regression coe￿-
cients.
18There are 33 such newspapers, out of a total of 839.
19This is driven by the fact that there is simply less variation in the gender distribution across zipcodes
than in the education distribution, as can be seen from Table 1.
185% 25% 50% 75% 99% Mean N
Segmentation:
Race 0.017 0.093 0.195 0.325 0.853 0.232 3356
Income 0.022 0.101 0.215 0.366 0.769 0.253 3356
Education 0.026 0.116 0.237 0.398 0.802 0.274 3356
Age 0.017 0.087 0.194 0.336 0.831 0.239 3356
Gender 0.017 0.085 0.179 0.310 0.769 0.219 3356
Distance 0.200 0.437 0.576 0.703 0.916 0.558 3356
All 0.372 0.607 0.739 0.853 0.986 0.713 3225
Table 3: Correlation of demographics with per capita circulation: selected percentiles
number of explanatory variables decreases the number of available observations, as described
above. For example, I have tried to use the fraction of the population in various other
age categories, the fraction without a high school degree, the fraction below the poverty
line or within various income categories, and the fraction in other race categories. The
correlations using these variables are very similar to the values already reported, therefore
in the interest of retaining as many observations as possible, I have employed an economical
list of demographic characteristics.
I now examine whether markets with more newspapers exhibit increased segmentation,
i.e. whether newspapers in such markets have more homogenous readers. Recall that this
could be one explanation for the results of Table 2 which implied that markets with more
newspapers had higher advertising prices. In order to quantify homogeneity, I use the R-
square measure described above. I examine three statistics: The correlation between the
Her￿ndahl Index in an MSA and the average R-square of all the newspapers circulating in
that MSA; the correlation between the number of newspapers circulating in an MSA and
the average R-square of these papers; and the correlation between the Weighted Her￿ndahl
index at each newspaper (described in Section 4) and its R-square measure. The results are
shown in Table 4. The ￿rst two correlations have one observation per MSA per year, while
the third has one per newspaper per year. All three correlations suggest that newspapers
in more competitive markets have more homogenous readers. Note that the correlation
19Correlation with Signi￿cance N
seg. measure Level
MSA Her￿ndahl Index -0.166 99% 1324
MSA Number of Papers 0.174 99% 1324
Newspaper Weighted Her￿ndahl -0.208 99% 3225
Table 4: The relation between competition and segmentation
values do not imply the direction of causality; it may be, for example, that markets with
homogenous readers attract entry. Regardless, the correlations are consistent with the
results shown in Table 2 that markets with more newspapers have higher advertising prices,
since they suggest that these markets segment readers into distinct groups. Note also that
all three correlations in Table 4 are highly signi￿cant. The magnitudes are moderately high;
however, as discussed in Section 4, these values are derived from means at the zip-code level,
and would probably be substantially larger if reader-level data were available.
Segmentation of readers according to demographics may be one way by which advertis-
ers are able to target consumers. Another may be reader homogeneity de￿ned according to
the location of these readers. To the extent that retail advertising is placed by local estab-
lishments, retailers may not value having the paper dispersed over a wide geographic area
as this would dilute the impact of advertising. That is, for a given circulation, advertisers
would rather see readers located in a dense, concentrated area rather that in a dispersed,
wide-ranging area. To measure geographic dispersion I calculate, for each zip-code in which
a newspaper is present, its distance from the newspaper’s home zip-code. This is de￿ned as
the zip-code where the newspaper’s publishing o￿ce is located.20 I then use as a measure
of dispersion of the newspaper’s circulation various statistics such as the median zip-code’s
distance or the standard deviation of all the distances, weighted by circulation. Distance
is calculated using data on the latitudes and longitudes of the centroid of each zip code as
provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.
It is also useful to measure the competitive nature of each ￿rm’s market and to examine
whether competing ￿rms drive down prices. The market itself, though, is not easily de￿ned.
One option would be to count all the ￿rms in the MSA- the problems with this are that this
obviously restricts attention only to ￿rms in MSAs, as well as that multiple newspapers can
20I also tried de￿ning the home zip as the zip-code where the newspaper has its highest per capita
circulation. The di￿erence between the two measures is very small- publishing o￿ces are usually located in
or close to the areas where the newspaper has its most dense circulation.
20exist in an MSA without being in direct competition with each other. Another alternative
would be to simply count the number of ￿rms in which each newspaper comes into contact-
i.e. the total number of newspapers that overlap with its given circulation area. Again, this
takes no account of the extent to which competing newspapers actually serve as substitutes
for advertisers, since newspapers could overlap in markets despite market power being very
high for one ￿rm. The measure that I use is constructed as follows: for each newspaper I
identify the base MSA as the one where its circulation is the highest. There is rarely any
ambiguity in this exercise; for example, The Birmingham News circulates in 9 of Alabama’s
12 MSAs (as well as a number of non-metropolitan zip codes), but over 90% of its circulation
is concentrated in the Birmingham MSA. Next, for each newspaper I count the number of
competing ￿rms which share the same base MSA- this is the number of ￿rms that I use in the
regressions below. This ensures that I count among a newspaper’s competitors only those
￿rms which share the same primary market and whose circulation and pricing decisions are
most likely to a￿ect the newspaper’s own price.
Note that estimation does not require the use of quantity data on advertising since the
reduced form eliminates this variable from the analysis. A testable implication of the model,
though, is that newspapers with higher circulation print more advertising- a standard result
since an increase in circulation shifts out the demand curve and therefore the monopolist’s
marginal revenue curve, and implies higher quantity. I have advertising data on a subset of
the ￿rms in my sample and ￿nd a strong positive correlation between circulation and the
number of column inches of advertising printed. See Chandra (2006a) for details.
5.2 Regression Results
Table 5 contains the results of estimating equation 1. The dependent variable is the log
of the daily advertising rate. The distance measure is the distance, in tens of kilometers,
of the median zip-code from the newspaper’s publishing o￿ce zip-code. The ￿rst column
simply regresses this variable on mean demographics of the zip-codes in which the newspaper
circulates, the number of pages in the newspaper, and the distance of the median zip-code
from the newspaper’s publishing o￿ce. The next ￿ve columns provide estimates using the
various correlation measures of segmentation, according to education, race, age, income
and Hispanic status. Clearly, no matter which measure is used, there is a strong and
signi￿cant relationship between the segmentation measures and advertising rates per reader.
For example, a ten percentage point increase in the correlation of the fraction white with
per capita circulation is associated with an increase in advertising rates of around 2%.
Each segmentation measure is signi￿cant at the 99% con￿dence level. Other correlation
measures { according to gender and various income and education demographic variables













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22negative relation to advertising rates as well, con￿rming the hypothesis that, controlling
for circulation, newspapers that are more dispersed have lower advertising rates. Other
regressors in the estimation, the coe￿cients of which are not reported, include year ￿xed
e￿ects and the average number of retail establishments in the newspaper’s circulation area.
The number of pages in the newspaper has a negative and strongly signi￿cant relation
with advertising prices; on average, an additional 10 pages in a newspaper is associated
with an 8% reduction in advertising prices. As discussed above, estimation does not require
the use of quantity data on advertising, since the reduced form speci￿cation eliminates
this variable. However, one would expect that the number of pages in the newspaper is
correlated with the quantity of advertising. To that extent, the coe￿cient on the number
of pages is likely to be biased, although the direction of the bias is uncertain. Nevertheless,
the negative and strongly signi￿cant coe￿cient on the number of pages is likely to re￿ect,
at least partly, the crowding out e￿ect of advertising; that is, that advertisers have a lower
willingness-to-pay to advertise in a larger newspaper, keeping all else equal.
Column 7 uses all the individual correlation measures together. This does not change
the results for the distance measure and the number of pages. However, it becomes clear
that age and Hispanic status are associated with higher advertising prices than the other
segmentation measures. Some of the other coe￿cients decrease, but this is due to the fact
that the various segmentation measures are correlated; for example, populations that are
homogenous along demographics such as race, age and education are more likely to be
homogenous according to income. In other words, while segmentation by income increases
advertising prices, it does not do so once we control for race and age segmentation.
So far, I have used the various measures of segmentation separately. However, the op-
timal technique would involve combining all of these measures. To achieve this, I simply
regress per capita circulation in each zip-code on all the demographic and geographic vari-
ables available, and use the ￿t of that regression as the measure of reader homogeneity. The
regression is:
mik = ￿0 + ￿1FractionWhitek + ￿2Incomek + ￿3Educationk + ￿4Distik
This is simply an extension of the logic above; newspapers with an extremely homoge-
nous subscriber base should have a substantially higher R-square from such a regression
than newspapers with a more varied, heterogenous audience.
Column 8 of Table 5 includes this R-square measure, labeled as Combined Segmen-
tation, and omits the individual correlations. Clearly, the coe￿cient on this measure is
positive and highly signi￿cant. Note that the coe￿cient is considerably higher than the
coe￿cients on the individual correlations. This is to be expected, as the R-square contains
all the information of the individual correlations. The results suggest that an increase of
2310 percentage points in the ￿rst stage R-square leads to an increase in the advertising price
per reader of around 2.7%. To put these results into perspective, consider two newspapers;
one where demographics perfectly predict circulation, and the other where demographics
are completely uncorrelated with circulation. This translates into ￿rst stage R-squares of
1 and 0 respectively. The results suggest, keeping all other characteristics identical, the
￿rst newspaper will be able to charge almost 30% more per subscriber. And, as pointed out
above, these results are merely a lower bound on the actual e￿ect of subscriber homogeneity
on advertising prices.
Columns 9 and 10 provide some alternative speci￿cations using the Combined Segmen-
tation measure. Column 9 uses the between estimator, which averages variation across time
and relies solely on variation between ￿rms, can be used to examine the same relationship
as above. To see the di￿erence between the pooled case with time ￿xed e￿ects and the
between estimator, note that the former treats observations from the same newspaper over
time as being independent, and simply allows for an average year e￿ect to be estimated.
By contrast, the latter ignores all the variation across time for a given newspaper, and
instead averages the dependent and independent variables over time for each unit, using
only variation across units to estimate the model.
The standard errors in Column 9 are naturally larger than before because there is
e￿ectively only one observation per ￿rm, but the general magnitudes and signs of the
coe￿cients are similar to the pooled case.21 Additionally, using the between estimator with
individual segmentation measures leads to results that are very similar to those in columns
2 through 6.
Finally, Column 10 includes market ￿xed e￿ects in the regressions which accounts for
unobserved heterogeneity across markets, but common among ￿rms in the same market
(MSA). As can be seen, the magnitudes and signi￿cance of most of the variables are qualita-
tively the same, with the exception of the number of ￿rms. Now this variable is statistically
indistinguishable from zero; suggesting that unobserved characteristics that lead to more
￿rms in a market also lead to more value to advertising to readers in such markets. The
insigni￿cant coe￿cient on the number of ￿rms also lends credence to the hypothesis that
competing ￿rms should not have any e￿ect on each ￿rm’s advertising price. Note that co-
e￿cients on some of the demographic variables are signi￿cantly di￿erent in this regression.
This is due to restricting attention to newspapers in MSAs, as well as estimating MSA ￿xed
e￿ects.22
It is worth emphasizing again that these results greatly underestimate the e￿ect of
21An additional speci￿cation (not reported), which clusters standard errors by newspaper, leads to results
that are very similar in magnitude and signi￿cance to those of the between estimator.
22All the results in this Table are robust to splitting the data according to the number of ￿rms in the
market. Separate regressions for markets with 1, 2 and 3 or more newspapers provide very similar results.
24targeted advertising. As an example, consider a newspaper circulating in 20 zip-codes, with
an average readership of 500 in each zip-code. With individual level data on subscribers’
characteristics, this would provide 10,000 data points to estimate the e￿ects of demographics
on advertising prices. In my study, I may rely on just 20 observations. Moreover, these 20
would be averages and would therefore have lower variance, and lower predictive power, than
observations on individual readers or households. Despite these limitations, the results show
that targeted advertising, as measured by zip-code means, is associated with signi￿cantly
higher advertising prices.
To summarize the results of this section, I have shown that newspapers with more
homogenous subscribers charge higher advertising prices, holding constant newspaper char-
acteristics as well as market ￿xed e￿ects. The results suggest that an increase of 10 per-
centage points in the predictive power of demographics on circulation are associated with
advertising prices that are almost 3% higher. My earlier results (see Table 4) showed that
markets with more newspapers tended to have greater segmentation. Taken together, these
results explain the phenomenon described in Table 2 that markets with more newspapers
have higher advertising prices, on average. The results are consistent with the notion that
advertisers value more homogenous groups of consumers.
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined how advertising prices are determined in newspaper markets.
Although the application can be extended to other media markets too, newspaper markets
probably provide the ideal data to analyze how the degree of subscriber targeting a￿ects
advertising rates and the value of placing advertisements.
I ￿rst document that newspapers in more competitive markets have lower advertising
prices per reader. I then use detailed data on circulation along with information on prices
and other newspaper characteristics to show that markets with more newspapers are bet-
ter able to segment readers according to geography and demographics, thereby increasing
the homogeneity of each newspaper’s subscribers. Finally, I show that this homogeneity
translates into higher advertising prices through greater valuation of homogenous groups
by advertising ￿rms. This increased valuation on the demand-side is enough to outweigh
the competitive e￿ect on the supply-side of having more newspapers in the market.
The results relating subscriber homogeneity to advertising prices are extremely conserva-
tive estimates. Due to the aggregate nature of the data, I rely completely on variation across
zip-codes, entirely ignoring variation within zip-codes. To the extent that this still leads
to consistently positive and strongly signi￿cant estimates, it implies that subscriber homo-
25geneity potentially plays an extremely important role in determining advertising value.23
The results suggest that media targeting, and the segmentation of subscribers into well-
de￿ned groups, adds value to advertisers by allowing them to hone in on consumers who
are more likely to buy their products. Multiple media with smaller, sharply di￿erentiated
audiences, therefore, are likely to provide greater value to advertisers than large media with
heterogenous subscribers.
From the point of view of consumers too, it appears that better targeting of advertising
is utility enhancing. The results of Chandra (2006a) seem to con￿rm that consumers derive
higher utility, or lower disutility, from the advertising of products that are more relevant to
them. However, the e￿ect of concentration on readers’ welfare may be ambiguous since my
results also show that newspapers in concentrated markets have higher circulation prices.24
By contrast, my results suggest a clear gain to the advertising side of this market from
having more media; not simply through the avenue of lower advertising prices, but due to
the greater opportunities for consumer targeting that result.
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